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Recent Decisions
LAw-TAX SALEs-The United States
Supreme Court has held that the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment requires notice by mail to mortgagees prior to a
tax sale.
NOTICE-CONSTITUTIONAL

Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983).
Under Indiana law, real property on which tax payments have
been delinquent for fifteen months or longer may be sold by the

county.' This sale is by public auction and the seized property is
sold to the highest bidder.2 The tax-sale purchaser acquires a lien
against the property for the amount paid. This lien is superior to
all liens already in existence against the property.3
A two year statutory redemption period follows the sale. During
this time, any person with an interest in the property may redeem
the property by paying an amount sufficient to reimburse the purchaser, and to cover penalties and interest.4 Shortly before the expiration of the redemption period, the tax-sale purchaser may apply for a deed to the property. The owner of the property is
notified, by certified mail, that he may still redeem the property.'
If the owner fails to redeem the property, a deed may be executed
and delivered to the tax-sale purchaser, who thus acquires an estate in fee simple, free of all liens and encumbrances.6 The purchaser may then bring an action to quiet title.7 The property can
no longer be redeemed and the purchaser's title can only be defeated by proving, inter alia, that the tax sale was invalid, or that
the property had been properly redeemed during the statutory
period."
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2708 (1983).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 2709.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The Indiana tax-sale statute required three forms of notice prior
to the sale of a property for delinquent taxes: (1) notice published
in a newspaper of general circulation in the county; (2) notice
posted at the county courthouse; and (3) notice by certified mail to
the owner of the property at his last known address.' Notice to
mortgagees of a property, either by mail or personal service was
not required. 10
In 1973 Alfred Jean Moore executed a mortgage in favor of the
Mennonite Board of Missions, an administrative branch of the
Mennonite Church." This mortgage secured an indebtedness of
$14,000 and encumbered property located in Elkhart, Indiana.
Under the terms of the mortgage, Moore was to pay all taxes on
2
the property.
Although Moore regularly made her mortgage payments, she
failed to pay the taxes. As a result, in 1977, Elkhart county began
proceedings to sell the land at public auction.' 3 As required by the
Indiana statute, notice was published, posted, and sent to Moore
by certified mail. Notice was not given to the Mennonite Board of
Missions by either the county or Moore, and the Board was una4
ware of the tax sale.'
The property was sold at public auction to Richard Adams on
August 8, 1977. Moore did not attempt to redeem the property,
but continued to make mortgage payments to the Board. Moore
did not respond to the notice by certified mail that the statutory
redemption period was about to expire, and on August 16, 1979,
when the Board of Missions first learned of the tax sale, the redemption period had expired, with Moore still owing the Board
$8,237. 19.15
In November 1979, after obtaining a deed to the property, Adams brought an action to quiet title, naming Moore and the Board
9. Id. at 2708.
10. Id. Under Indiana law a mortgagee has a lien against the property mortgaged and
does not have title. A mortgagee is not considered an owner unless he is in possession of the
property, and thus he does not qualify as an owner under Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24-4 (1984). See
103 S. Ct. at 2708 n.1.
In 1980, Ind. Code § 6-1.1-24.2 was adopted. This section requires notice by certified mail
to mortgagees who have annually requested such notice, and who have agreed to pay a fee to
cover the cost of such notice. This provision was not in effect when the events leading up to
this case occurred, and hence was not considered by the Court. See 103 S. Ct. at 2708 n.2.
11. 103 S. Ct. at 2708.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 2709.
14. Id.
15. Id.
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as defendants. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor
of Adams, thus extinguishing the Board's mortgage. 16
The Board appealed to the Court of Appeals of Indiana, maintaining that the Indiana tax-sale statute was violative of the due
process requirements of the fourteenth amendment to the United
States Constitution as it did not provide for actual notice to mortgagees.17 The Indiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision, citing the presumption of the constitutionality of a statute
and relying on a prior decision in which the court had held constructive notice to be adequate in a similar situation.' 8
After the Board's Petition for Transfer to the Indiana Supreme
Court was denied, the Board appealed to the United States Supreme Court, which noted probable jurisdiction.' 9
The Supreme Court subsequently reversed the Indiana Court of
Appeals, and held that the notice given to the Mennonite Board of
Missions had failed to meet the due process requirements of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution.20
Justice Marshall,2 ' writing for the majority, found the case to be
controlled by the Court's decision in Mullane v. Central Hanover
Bank & Trust Co. 22 In that landmark case, the Court held that
prior to conducting a proceeding which would affect an interest in
life, liberty, or property, due process required that the state provide "notice reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances" to
apprise interested parties of the proceeding and give them an op16. Id.
17. Id. Note, however, that because the delinquent taxes were a matter of public record, and notice of the tax sale was published and posted in a public place, the Mennonite
Board of Missions would be charged, under the applicable Indiana statute, with constructive
notice of the sale. Constructive notice is notice which is implied by law and is not dependent
upon the actual knowledge of the party, or upon actual notice (such as by mail or personal
service) to the party. R. BOYER, SURVEY OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY, 478 (3d ed. 1981).
18. Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 427 N.E.2d 686, 687-88 (Ind. App. 1981);
rev'd, 103 S. Ct. 2706 (1983). The decision relied upon by the court of appeals in rejecting
the Board's arguments was First Saving & Loan Ass'n of Central Indiana v. Furnish, 174
Ind. App. 265, 367 N.E.2d 596 (1977). In that decision, the court stated: "[djue process does
not require that a mortgagee be given actual notice of a tax sale." 174 Ind. App. at 269, 367
N.E.2d at 599.
The Mennonite Board of Missions also argued that providing for actual notice to owners
of the property, and not to mortgagees was a violation of the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. This argument was rejected by the Indiana
Court of Appeals and was not addressed by the Supreme Court.
19. 103 S. Ct. 204 (1982).
20. 103 S. Ct. 2706, 2712 (1983).
21. Joined by Burger, C.J., and Brennan, White, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ.
22. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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portunity to be heard. 3
In applying the holding of Mullane to the facts in this case, Justice Marshall first asserted that a mortgagee's lien constitutes a
substantial interest in property which is protected by due process
requirements. 4 The Court then pointed out that a tax sale adversely affects a mortgagee's interest by (1) immediately giving the
tax-sale purchaser a superior lien, and (2) extinguishing the2 5mortgagee's lien completely after the redemption period lapses.
Having found Mullane applicable to the case, the Court then
proceeded to evaluate the reasonableness of the notice given mortgagees under the Indiana statute. Citing Mullane, the Court first
condemned constructive notice as an ineffective and unreliable
form of notice, and pointed out that posted and published notice
of a tax sale is designed primarily to attract bidders to the sale, not
to reach mortgagees. 26 The Court maintained that actual notice to
the owner of the property is also unlikely to reach a mortgagee, as
and the owner has althe owner and mortgagee are not in privity
27
ready failed to protect his own interests.
Noting the much greater effectiveness of notice by mail, the
Court concluded that constructive notice is not reasonably calculated to provide a mortgagee with notice of a tax sale, and held
that when a mortgagee is identified in a publicly recorded mortgage, that mortgagee is entitled to notice either by mail to its last
known address or by personal service. 8
Justice Marshall also rejected Adam's argument that since mortgagees have various means available to protect their interests from
tax sales, the state need not provide actual notice. Justice Marshall
asserted in response that the law should protect the least sophisticated mortgagee, who may not know how to protect himself, adding also that a party's ability to protect himself does not relieve
the state of its duty to provide constitutionally adequate notice."
23. Id. at 314.
24. 103 S. Ct. at 2711.
25. Id.
26. Id. See also Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112, 116 (1956); New York v.
New York, N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296 (1953).
27. Id. The Court cited Nelson v. New York City, 352 U.S. 103, 107-09 (1956), as an
example of a case in which the necessary relationship between the party receiving notice
and the party seeking relief did exist. In Nelson, failure of a bookkeeper to apprise his
employer of notice received that foreclosure proceedings would be instituted against the
employer's property resulted in default and loss of the employer's title to the city; no relief
was afforded. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 2712 (citing in analogous support New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.,
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The majority concluded by declaring that "[n]otice by mail or
other means as certain to ensure actual notice is a minimum constitutional precondition to a proceeding which will adversely affect
the liberty or property interest of any party, whether unlettered or
well versed in commercial practice, if its name and address are reasonably ascertainable." 3
In a dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor characterized the majority opinion as a significant departure from Mullane, criticizing
the opinion as establishing an unwarranted general rule against
constructive notice, and as erroneous in its application of Mullane
to the case. 1
Justice O'Connor maintained that Mullane established a balancing test, in which the requirements of due process are determined
by balancing the interests of the state with those of the individual
in light of the particular facts and circumstances of the case. She
claimed that it is the responsibility of the state to strike this balance, and that the Supreme Court should only intervene when the
32
balance is struck in an irrational manner.
Justice O'Connor asserted that while the Court in Mullane and
its progeny had consistently pointed out the impossibility of establishing a rigid formula for determining due process requirements,
the majority had now established a general rule that constructive
notice is inadequate for any party in any proceeding where the
identity and address of the party is reasonably ascertainable.3 3
Justice O'Connor expressed great concern over the consequences
of establishing such a rule without knowing the circumstances of
future cases. She also maintained that it was uncertain under the
majority opinion how far the state must go in making "reasonable
efforts" to ascertain the identity of parties involved in a proceeding, and that this uncertainty was particularly ominous in view of
the broad scope of the rule which the majority had established. 4
344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953)).
30. Id. (emphasis in original).
31. 103 S. Ct. at 2712 (O'Connor, J., dissenting, joined by Powell and Rehnquist, JJ.).
32. Id. at 2713 (citing Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315).
33. Id.
34. Id. at 2713-15. Justice O'Connor asserted that the majority had, in fact, departed
from prior case law. In the prior cases relied upon by the majority, she pointed out, "the
State either actually knew the identity or incapacity of the party seeking notice, or that
identity was 'very easily ascertainable.'" Id. at 2714-15 (quoting Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U.S. 208, 212-13 (1962)). Continuing, Justice O'Connor maintained that:
Under the Court's decision today, it is not clear how far the state must go in providing for reasonable efforts to ascertain the name and address of an affected party.
Indeed, despite the fact that the recorded mortgage failed to include the appellant's
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Justice O'Connor then analyzed the application of the Mullane
interest balancing test to this particular case. She first declared
that the state has a strong interest in collecting tax revenues and
avoiding the burden of searching for names and addresses of mortgagees.3 5 She then proceeded to assert that the interest of mortgagees must be evaluated in terms of mortgagees as a class, and in
view of the practical circumstances surrounding that class. The
dissent pointed out that (1) mortgagees are able to protect their
interests at the time the mortgage is executed; (2) tax assessments
are regular events that can be anticipated and monitored; and (3)
property owners as a class have historically had an affirmative duty
to protect their interests. 6
Justice O'Connor concluded that the state has no duty to save a
mortgagee from his unreasonableness in failing to protect his interests, and that constructive notice should satisfy the Mullane due
process requirements when considering the facts and circum37
stances of this case.
Constitutional requirements of notice were historically dependent upon the classification of an action as either in rem or in personam. Constructive notice was generally adequate if an action was
in rem, and actual notice was required if an action was in personam. 8 In 1950, however, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank &
Trust Co.,39 the Supreme Court rejected the use of such classifications as litmus tests used to determine due process notice
the Court concludes that its whereabouts were "reasonably identifiable"
address .
. . . This uncertainty becomes particularly ominous in light of the fact that the duty
to ascertain identity and location, and to notify by mail or other similar means, exists
whenever any legally protected interest is implicated.
103 S. Ct. at 2715.
35. Id. at 2715.
36. Id. at 2716-17.
37. Id.
38. Generally, a proceeding in personam is an action against a person, while a proceeding in rem is an action against a particular property to determine rights of all the world
with respect to that property. See Tyler v. Judges of the Court of Registration, 175 Mass.
71, 76-77, 55 N.E. 812, 814 (1900). Under the jurisdictional doctrine of the late nineteenth
century, states could not exercise personal service of process outside their borders. Thus, in
order to allow a state to judicially determine rights in a property located within its borders,
when claimants to the property were located out of state, it was necessary that constructive
notice by publication or posting be deemed sufficient for out-of-state claimants. The doctrine that constructive notice is adequate for proceedings in rem thus developed. See, Note,
The Constitutionality of Notice by Publication in Tax Sale Proceedings,84 YALE L.J. 1505,
1506-07 (1975).
39. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
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requirements.4
In Mullane, the Court evaluated the constitutional sufficiency of
notice given of a judicial settlement of accounts for a common
trust fund. The Court held that constructive notice was not sufficient as to beneficiaries of the trust fund whose identities were
known, and that these beneficiaries were entitled to notice by mail
or personal service."'
In reaching its conclusion, the Court established a test in which
the interest sought to be protected by the fourteenth amendment
and the interest of the state are balanced to determine the extent
of notice required for a particular proceeding."2 Declining to commit itself to any rigid formula for achieving this balance, the Court
emphasized reasonableness as the primary consideration. The
Court concluded that "an elementary and fundamental requirement of due process in any proceeding which is to be accorded finality is notice -reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances,
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections."' 3
Although the Mullane Court generally characterized constructive notice as unreliable, the Court asserted that under certain circumstances constructive notice may be adequate." Specifically
mentioned as circumstances under which constructive notice might
be acceptable were situations in which the identities of interested
parties are unknown, and instances where constructive notice is
supplemented by some other action likely to provide actual
5
notice.4
The principles outlined in Mullane constitute the framework in
which constitutional notice cases have since been evaluated. These
principles have been applied in a wide variety of situations.
6 the Court held that notice of
In Walker v. City of Hutchinson,"
condemnation proceedings by publication in a city newspaper did
not satisfy due process requirements, since the property owner's
identity was available from public records. In a more recent case,
40. Id. at 312-13.
41. Id. at 320.
42. Id. at 313-14.
43. Id. at 314.
44. Id. at 315-17.
45. Id. at 316-17. The Mullane Court listed libel of a ship, attachment of a chattel and
entry upon real estate as examples of the type of action which, when supplementing constructive notice, is likely to provide actual notice. Id. at 316.
46. 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
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Greene v. Lindsey, "I notice of a forcible entry and detainer action
was posted on the apartment doors of tenants. Based on testimony
that these notices were sometimes torn down by other tenants, the
Court held that such notice was not reasonably calculated, under
the circumstances, to notify the tenants of the action. 8 The Court
asserted that notice by mail would go a long way toward satisfying
due process requirements in cases of this type. 9
The availability of a reasonably inexpensive and relatively effective mail system, and the resulting diminished burden of providing
actual notice, has been the major factor which has allowed broad
application of Mullane to strike down constructive notice.50 The
trend has clearly been toward using certified mail as an addition to
constructive notice in all cases where the identities of affected parties are known. 1
Prior to Mennonite, the United States Supreme Court had not
determined the extent of notice constitutionally required before
tax sales. 52 Most state courts which have decided this issue considered the narrower question of whether owners rather than mortgagees of a property are entitled to actual notice prior to a tax sale.
Several state courts applied Mullane and held that constructive
notice to owners of property prior to a tax sale does not meet due
process standards. 5 3 Other courts found such notice to be adequate.54 Courts in this latter group supported their holdings by distinguishing tax sales from other situations to which Mullane has
47. 102 S. Ct. 1874 (1982).
48. Id. at 1881.
49. Id. at 1880.
50. See id. at 1881; Mennonite Board of Missions v. Adams, 103 S. Ct. at 2711 n.4.
51. See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); (notice by mail required prior to condemnation proceeding); City of New York v. New York, N.H. & H.R. Co.,
344 U.S. 293 (1953) (notice by mail to lienholder required prior to bankruptcy proceeding).
52. The Court had considered a tax-sale case which involved the constitutionality of
notice to a known mental incompetent. See Covey v. Town of Somers, 351 U.S. 141 (1956).
The Court there held that constructive notice, even when coupled with notice by mail, was
inadequate. The Court had not ruled, however, on the issue of the constitutionality of constructive notice of tax sales in general.
53. See, e.g., Township of Montville v. Block 69, Lot 10, 74 N.J. 1, 376 A.2d 909
(1977), in which the New Jersey Supreme Court held that prior to a tax foreclosure, notice
to a property owner by mail was required if the owner's name and address were listed on the
tax rolls. For a discussion of this case, see, Comment, In Rem Tax Foreclosures-DueProcess Requires Notice by Mail When Name and Address of Taxpayer are Easily Ascertainable, 9 RUT.-CAM. 565 (1978).
54. See, e.g., Marlowe v. Kingdom Hall of Jehovah's Witnesses, 541 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn.
1976). See also Note, Due Process in Tax Sales in New York: The Insufficiency of Notice
by Publication, 25 SYaAcusE L. REv. 769 (1974).
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been applied. 5 Courts finding that constructive notice of tax sales
met all due process requirements have reasoned that since tax revenues are essential to the operation of the state, any burden which
would hinder or delay the state in the collection of these revenues
cannot be tolerated. 56 Secondly, some courts have argued that
while condemnation proceedings (and other types of state action to
which Mullane has been applied) may come as a surprise to a
property owner, the assessment of taxes is a regular, predictable
event, and property owners should be charged with knowledge of
what will happen if taxes are not paid. 57 This assertion is strengthened by the historical doctrine that property owners have a duty to
take reasonable steps to learn of any attack on their interest, a
doctrine which was noted in Mullane.5a
One problem with this argument, however, is that the state cannot be certain that taxes are actually delinquent without first verifying this with the property owner. If taxes designated as delinquent have actually been paid but not recorded, a property owner
who did not receive notice would not know to appear to contest the
tax sale.9
Despite the arguments for the adequacy of constructive notice, it
is reasonable to conclude that notice by mail to property owners
should be required under Mullane, since the burden of mailing notice, when the name and address of a property owner are readily
available from the tax rolls, is relatively modest, and the loss which
the owner may suffer as a result of a tax sale is great.
The arguments against requiring notice by mail to mortgagees,
however, are somewhat stronger. As Justice O'Connor pointed out
in her dissent in Mennonite, Mullane and subsequent cases have
held that the interest of the individual should be evaluated in
terms of the individual as a member of a class, and with regard to
the practicalities and peculiarities of that class.60 Mortgagees as a
class are more sophisticated in business affairs than property own55. For a comprehensive, detailed discussion of the various arguments advanced by
the states against requiring notice by mail prior to the tax sale, see Note, supra note 38.
56. See id at 1513-15.
57. See Note, Constitutional Law-Due Process-Notice by Publication in Tax Sale
Cases, 44 TENN. L. REv. 159, 166-68 (1976). This note discusses Marlowe v. Kingdom Hall of
Jehovah's Witnesses, 541 S.W.2d 121 (Tenn. 1976), in which the Supreme Court of Tennessee found notice by publication to be constitutionally sufficient for tax sales.
58. 339 U.S. at 316.
59. Note, supra note 38, at 1512-13.
60. See 103 S. Ct. at 2714 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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ers." Mortgagees voluntarily enter into a complicated business
transaction, and are able to take several steps to protect their interest. A mortgagee can (1) require copies of paid tax assessments
to be sent with the mortgage payments; (2) set up an escrow account and require tax payments to be made into that account; or
(3) periodically check public records to insure that no tax sale is
scheduled to take place. 2 It can thus be argued that the state need
not save a party from his own failure to take reasonable steps to
3
protect his interests in a voluntary business transaction.1
In addition, the burden on the state of identifying mortgagees
would be much greater than that of identifying owners. Title
searches would have to be performed and investigations conducted
to determine names and proper addresses. Although the costs of
these searches and investigations could be added to the amount of
taxes due, the delay and expense would occur prior to the sale.6"
Given the flexibility of the Mullane balancing of interest test,
the Court could have found that under the particular circumstances of Mennonite, the burden on the state to provide actual
notice would be too great, especially considering the ability of
mortgagees to protect themselves. By holding constructive notice
to be inadequate, the majority has gone beyond the principles established in Mullane.
Although Mullane and its progeny have contained strong lan61. See id. at 2716, where Justice O'Connor, citing the U.S. Department of Commerce
Statistical Abstract of the United States, stated that "[aipproximately 95% of the mortgage debt outstanding in the United States is held by private institutional lenders and federally-supported agencies."
62. Id. at 2716-17.
63. It can, however, be argued that the case for requiring actual notice to mortgagees
is actually stronger than that for requiring actual notices to owners, since the owner knows
he has not paid his taxes. The assumption inherent in this argument is that landowners
know the consequences of their failure to pay their property taxes. However, given the relative sophistication of mortgagees, see supra note 61, as compared with landowner, and the
fact that the mortgagee's interest in the property normally arises from a business transaction entered into for profit, while the objective of the landowner may often be just to obtain
a place to live, it seems more logical to assume that a mortgagee knows the consequences of
a failure to pay taxes, and that a landowner does not. See Note, supra note 38, at 1511-12.
64. The Illinois Supreme Court evaluated this problem in light of Mennonite and
stated:
In the case at bar, the names and addresses of the mortgagees are not readily at hand,
but can only be gleaned from a paper mountain by 121,000 title searches. Even if the
costs of a title search were passed onto the "consumer," the collector would be faced
with a chaotic situation, with tax sales delayed by a least six months while all the
title searches were analyzed.
Rosewell v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 459 N.E 2d 966 (Ill. 1984). For a discussion of this
case, see infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
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guage condemning constructive notice,"' they also have contained
clear language emphasizing the importance of the practicalities
and circumstance of each case, and the impossibility of establishing an inflexible formula for determining due process notice requirements." Prior to Mennonite, it would have been possible for
a state court applying Mullane to balance the interests involved,
and conclude that under the circumstances, constructive notice
meets due process requirements. After Mennonite, it would seem
that constructive notice is never adequate for any party who has a
substantial interest which could be affected by any proceeding, unless it would be impossible or extremely impractical to give that
party notice by mail. 7
Constructive notice supplemented by some "other action likely to
provide actual notice may still meet due process requirements
under Mennonite; however, it seems likely that if the Court is unwilling to require a relatively sophisticated mortgagee to protect
himself by means easily available, the Court would also be unwilling to require that less sophisticated persons protect themselves by
identifying and reacting to supplemental actions likely to provide
actual notice. Thus it appears that mailed notice would again be
required, provided that the party's name and address are "reasonably ascertainable."
The Mennonite Court did not limit the requirement of notice by
mail to those whose identities and addresses were easily ascertainable but rather extended the requirement to those parties whose
identities and addresses were "reasonably ascertainable."" Mennonite may thus have the effect of shifting the focus in many constitutional notice cases away from a balancing of interests towards
65. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 315, where the Court stated, "It would be idle to pretend
that publication alone . . .is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact
that their rights are before the courts." See also City of New York v. New York, N.H. &
H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 296, where the Court declared: "Notice by publication is a poor and
sometimes a hopeless substitute for actual service of notice. Its justification is difficult at
best." Id.
66. See Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314, where the Court declared, "The Court has not committed itself to any formula achieving a balance between these interests in a particular proceeding or determining when constructive notice may be utilized or what test it must meet."
Id. See also Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208, 212 (1962), where. the Court
stated that the Mullane Court had pointed out the "practical considerations which make it
impossible to draw a standard set of specifications as to what is constitutionally adequate
notice, to be mechanically applied in every situation." Id.
67. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Thus it seems that Mennonite should
replace Mullane as the benchmark case to be applied in all constitutional notice cases.
68. Id.
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a determination of the extent of the search for a party's identity
and address required under the "reasonably ascertainable" criterion. Still, the latitude available in setting the bounds of this criterion may allow some courts to circumvent the strict policy against
constructive notice which was implicit in Mennonite.
The "reasonably ascertainable" criterion of Mennonite, however,
may also open up a new avenue through which completed proceedings can be challenged on a case by case basis. Prior to Mennonite,
a tax-sale purchaser who made sure that notice was properly published and posted, could be confident that his tax-sale deed could
not be successfully challenged on a notice basis. 9 Now, after Mennonite, a mortgagee who did not receive actual notice, for example,
may challenge a tax-sale deed, claiming that the state did not
make reasonably diligent efforts to ascertain his identity or
address.
The effect of Mennonite on tax-sale statutes has already been
felt.7 Citing Mennonite, two state supreme courts have recently
declared their tax-sale statutes unconstitutional.
In First Pennsylvania Bank v. Lancaster County Tax Claim
Bureau,7 1 the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held Pennsylvania's
tax-sale statute unconstitutional since it failed to provide actual
notice to mortgagees prior to the sale. The court felt bound by
Mennonite, despite the fact that under the Pennsylvania statute, a
mortgagee's interest would be destroyed only if the taxes for which
the property was sold were delinquent prior to the execution of the
mortgage. The court criticized Mennonite, agreeing with Justice
O'Connor's dissent which asserted that notice by publication is
reasonably calculated, under the circumstances, to notify mortga72
gees of a tax sale.
69. Except, of course, on a constitutional due process basis as was done in the instant
case.
70. The revised Indiana tax-sale statute provides for actual notice to those mortgagees
who have annually requested such notice, and who have agreed to cover the costs of that
notice. See supra note 11. Although the Court did not address the constitutionality of this
revised statute, it seems clear that it must be found unconstitutional under Mennonite. All
that the revised statute provides to a mortgagee is an additional method for the mortgagee
to protect himself. The Mennonite Court made it clear that a mortgagee is not required to
protect himself, and that a mortgagee is constitutionally entitled to actual notice regardless
of whether or not he acts to protect himself.
71. Pa. -,
470 A.2d 938 (1983).
72. Id. at 942. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania went further in applying Mennonite to the Pennsylvania tax-sale statute in In re Upset Sale, Tax Claim Bureau of Berks
County, - Pa. -,
479 A.2d 940 (1984). In the latter case, the court held that judgment
creditors of a property owner whose property was to be sold at a tax sale were entitled to
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In Lohr v. Cobur Corp.,73 the Supreme Court of Missouri applied
Mennonite to hold Missouri's tax-sale statute unconstitutional,
since it did not provide actual notice to beneficiaries of deeds of
trust. A concurring opinion was critical of Mennonite, citing the
additional problems that deeds of trust created in identifying interested parties. 4
The most obvious effect of the Mennonite decision is that local
governments will now be required to conduct title searches or
other investigations to determine the identities and addresses of
mortgagees prior to a tax sale. One state, Illinois, which has upheld
its tax-sale statute as constitutional under Mennonite, has a statutory scheme which shifts this burden of performing the title
searches and investigations onto the purchaser at the tax sale.
Under the Illinois statute, which was held constitutional in
Rosewell v. Chicago Title and Trust Co., 75 taxes constitute a prior
lien on a property, and property cannot be sold at a tax sale for a
value greater than the taxes plus penalties and interest. Therefore,
a mortgagee's interest is not diminished until the redemption period has run. A separate proceeding is held prior to the end of the
redemption period, and all interested parties, including mortgagees, receive actual notice of this proceeding.76 The burden of providing the actual notice is placed upon the purchaser at the tax
77
sale.
One decision, which cited Mennonite, but construed it narrowly,
actual notice of the tax sale. The court reached this conclusion reasoning that although a
judgment creditor's judgment lien is a general lien against all of the debtor's real property,
and not a specific lien against specific property (as is a mortgage), the judgment lien is still
an interest in property which merits due process protection. Id. at 944. The court then held
that the due process requirements would only be met if actual notice was provided. Id. at
945-46. Thus the Tax Bureau will be required to run a judgment search against a property
owner prior to selling his property, and to mail notice to any judgment creditors. Id. at 946.
A judgment lien does not attach to a debtor's property unless it is recorded in the Prothonotary's Office. Id. at 943.
73. 654 S.W.2d 883 (Mo. 1983).
74. Id. at 887 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Judge Blackmun stated:
The record, of course, does not show whether the named cestui still holds the note
secured by deed of trust. The trustee is usually a passive party, often named without
being specifically advised of the particular transaction, and the value of notice to him
or her is problematical. Yet these names are the only ones available in the public
records.
75. 99 Ill.2d 407, 459 N.E.2d 966 (1984).
76. Id. at 415, 459 N.E.2d at 970.
77. One disadvantage to this type of statutory scheme, however, is that the owner is
certain to suffer a complete loss of his equity if he fails to redeem. There is no possibility
that there will be any excess proceeds from the tax sale which could partially compensate
the owner.

786

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 23:773

was Grant County v. Guyer.78 Under an Oregon statute, the owners of property upon which taxes are delinquent are sent warning
notices by mail once a year for three consecutive years. 79 These
notices state that if the property owner fails to pay the delinquent
taxes by a certain date, proceedings may be initiated by the county
to foreclose.8 0 The owners are not, however, given notice by mail of
the foreclosure sale itself. The only notice immediately prior to the
sale is by publication and posting. 81
The court in Guyers held that this constructive notice, supplemented by the notices mailed during the three previous years, met
due process standards.8 2 In justifying its conclusion the court relied
upon arguments which had been implicitly rejected in Mennonite."3 This decision may indicate a tendency by some courts to construe Mennonite narrowly as a specific application of Mullane,
rather than as an expansion of Mullane.
Mennonite has gone a step further than Mullane, however, by
establishing a general rule against constructive notice. It appears
that this decision will in many instances eliminate the balancing of
interests test established in Mullane, substituting instead a rule
which always calls for actual notice when a party's identity is reasonably ascertainable.
Mennonite's impact should not be limited to tax-sale cases, but
rather should extend to all constitutional notice cases. 84 However,
the reluctance of some state courts to abandon the balancing of
interests test may cause Mennonite to be interpreted narrowly until the Supreme Court applies the holding to another fact situation.
78.
79.

296 Or. 14, 672 P.2d 702 (1983).
Id. at 704.

80.
81.

Id.
Id.

82. Id. at 708.
83. The court emphasized the importance of taxes to the operation of the state, and
maintained that the property owners were fairly warned by the annual delinquency notices,
and should not have been taken by surprise. The court pointed out that in the cases following Mullane, the plaintiffs had no reason to anticipate the state action. Id. at 706. Although
these arguments were implicitly rejected in Mennonite, the essence of the Oregon court's
reasoning was that the Oregon statute provided for constructive notice of a tax sale supplemented by other action (the annual warning notices) likely to provide actual notice of the
tax sale. Thus the statute could be distinquished from the Indiana statute involved in Mennonite, as the Indiana statute provided for constructive notice alone. However, it still seems
that actual notice of the sale itself would be required under Mennonite. See supra p.783.
84. See supra note 67 and accompanying text. See also supra note 30 and accompanying text (discussing Mennonite Court's statement, 103 S. Ct. at 2712, that Mennonite standard should be applied in any "proceeding which will adversely affect the liberty or property interest of any party.").
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If the composition of the Supreme Court becomes more conservative before this takes place, the effect of Mennonite may be limited
to tax-sale cases, and the Mullane interest-balancing test may remain as the cornerstone of constitutional notice cases.
ChristopherH. Connors

